



IEE/CoE Conference: Session notes for written report

What follows constitutes the main ideas of the debate between students from the IEE and the CoE. They were divived into 5 thematic groups and they exchanged views on the following themes: The institutional framework of the EU; Enlargement and neighbourhood policy; Policies and responses to Europe's challenges; Europe in the world: Towards Strategic Autonomy; Economic governance of the EU.

These CoE and IEE students are studying European Studies in the time of writing. They organized during several months a special event where they finally both had the chance to meet and to discuss with each other in different panels.



European
Union shall not
grant power to
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institution.



Panel 1: Institutional framework of the EU


- 1. Evolution of the power of the institutions
- a) New EUCO (comparison between Juncker/Tusk and Charles Michel/Ursula)

Focusing on the question of if there is a probability for the European Council to become the center of the decision making of the European Union and the center of power, there is a common view that the European Union can not be weighted entirely on one institution. To begin with, in foreign relations there are two hats, and it is agreed that the question is not raised in the external relations, rather it seems to be found more in the eternal point of EU and more specifically on who runs the EU. Therefore, it is argued that having a single person representing the EU and a single institution weighted with its main functioning, would create more tensions and dysfunctionalities, as the supranational and intergovernmental form of perspective would not coexist harmonically. A case study in comparing the institutions and the strength the EU Council has been bestowed, has been the comparison between Fedherica Mogherini and Charles Michel with Jean-Claude Juncker and Donald Tusk. Their collaboration, the Commission and the European Council, depends on the relationship between the personality representing them. In the current situation, they disagree on different policies, but they agree on other policies, relations with Russia.

→ Thus, European Union shall not grant power to only one institution. The double hat is a way to bring out the message that the European Union is united.

Moreover, the establishment of a single voting procedure and a complete consensus is not questioned, and it is commonly agreed that the voting procedure in the European Council cannot be simply changed as many issues shall be taken into consideration such as the fact that is it not always feasible to reach to a consensus,







especially having 27 Member States representing different national interests. Therefore, a turn to a c consensus would be an impasse to many decisions.

→ Thus, the European Union shall not consider the complete consensus on the trot, rather shall consider carefully its implications.

b. Interinstitutional relations with the Parliament: The failure of Spitzenkandidat

Has the shift of power to do with the interinstitutional shift of power or it can be seen as game of forces?

Answering to that question, and arguing on the failure of the Spitzenkandidaten, there is a common agreement that the main problem has been the head of the list who constitute at the same time the leader of a political party. It seems that there is no transparency. On the other hand, it has been discussed that the Spitzenkandidaten can increase legitimacy.

Nevertheless, in that case it is pointed out that the European Citizens are not well informed for this system and cannot get engaged.

- → The European citizens shall be more informed on the procedures that take place internally. It shall be a representation of the European citizens and not a display of authority.
- 2. Conference on the Future of Europe How can we open the EU for the citizens? Are we actually open enough, but it is just complicated?
- i. Treaty reform: towards new parchments?
- ii. New participative platform FuturEU
- iii. Disseminating the EU: the complexity of low salience issues

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
The EU is complex for EU citizens. It shall be more simplified. Why now, why are they having it now, is there any political intention of holding the conference.

A debate around the reason for the Conference of Europe taking place now has been a starting point on discussing the low turnout, the rise of Euroscepticism and the decline of the idea of the EU. So, the purpose can be found in disseminating Euroscepticism and functioning as a consultative platform. Regarding the outcomes of the Conference on the Future of Europe, it seems to exist a disbelief that they are going to be used and be taken into consideration. A common view has been expressed on the fact that the platform is used by 17.000 people out of 3 hundred people, so there is a lack of vital information as practically the European citizens are not sufficiently informed about this platform.

Moreover, it is argued that there already are existing tools that could be used for the same purposes in the European Union. An important tool mentioned is the European Citizens' Initiative. Even though the European Union does not have competence to all the areas (such as the Unconditional Basic Income) the ECI serves as a strong consultative tool, a voice of the European citizens that the EU shall strengthen and take into consideration.

- → The EU is complex for EU citizens. It shall be more simplified. The EU citizens shall be more well informed and have access to the information regarding the way of their direct and indirect involvement.
- → The importance of this initiative shall be better portrayed by the Media that plays a vital role in the information sharing.
- → A stronger interest in the CoE would be put in if it was followed by a Treaty reform, but it is argued that it would be dangerous having an unpredictable outcome.
- → The EU shall consider the idea of the establishment of the CoE ambassadors spreading the idea and the importance of the CoE to a national and regional level where more specific topics can be discussed.








- → The EU shall consider the idea of the establishment of a "Citizens Assembly" where people can come in touch and discuss different subjects.
- → The EU shall transmit the message of the important role education plays in a consolidated European purpose, a common history, a unifying moment (such as landing to Mars).
- → The EU shall be more transparent in order to increase its legitimacy (Not using the back door anymore)
- 3. Differentiated integration: Hamiltonian moment or the verge of a new crisis?
- a) Impact of COVID-19
- b) Prospects of integration in the light of the crisis
- c) Heading to a hard-core or soft-core Europe?
- It cannot be denied that there is already a differentiated integration and the further the EU integrates the bigger the gap will become between the northern and the southern part. The COVID-19 crisis has brought to the surface more vital issues that prove the differentiated needs and priorities of each Member State.
- · Next generation of the EU could be a great beginning of what it is to follow. It's the beginning of more integration which is based on redistribution of money. The probability of a following economic crisis raises the question of more funds in order to be better prepared to overcome it. The economic crisis might overcome the medical crisis.
- The Commission and the Council played an important role on the management of the crisis with the Commission to finance short term unemployment (even though it was brainstormed some years before), showing the united response.

· Most of the participants have pointed out that we are already in a soft-core Europe and that it would be difficult to head to a hard-core Europe. Nevertheless the point of view that in the future we will also need to consider heading to a hard-core Europe is expressed. For this to be achieved the question of what we want from Europe in order to move forward has to be answered.

Thus,

- → The EU shall focus more on the narrative of solidarity (which before has been prosperity).
- → The EU shall move on with the European Project bearing in mind that there is a differentiated integration, and the "smaller" Member States shall be treated as an equal element composing and shaping the European Project.
- → The EU shall encourage the opt-out. The EU is not moving to the same goals, it can't be expected from all the countries to move at the same pace. It depends on the type of differentiated integration. The multiplicity shall be accepted.







The possible solution could be in following the Central Asia pattern of bridging education and cooperation instead of mere investment, which is not sustainable at the end of the day.

Panel 2: Enlargement and neighbourhood policy (I am still compiling the notes taken, the below part is more of an introduction to the panel discussion covering the very first cluster. Iryna).


The discussion of panel on European
Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement focused on
three main strategic topics, outlining subsequent
sub-topics for discussion in each of the dimensions.
The experts touched upon the Southern Dimension
and the New Agenda for the Mediterranean, the
Eastern Partnership and the Western Balkans.

In the framework of the Southern Dimension, the panel discussed the evolution of the policy since the Barcelona Declaration, which would commemorate its 25th anniversary in the current year. The experts highlighted the fact that despite all the positive impact of the Southern Neighbourhood dimension policy of ENP in the past, certain regression can be seen in the recent years. Despite the fact that Southern dimension initially was the focus of the EU, taking into consideration the successful institutionalization of the policy, the EU ended up abandoning some of its ambitions in the region due to steady crises in the region, including the longlasting migration crisis, rather shifting its focus towards the priorities of its closer neighbourhood – the Eastern Partnership, whereby we can almost speak about the consequent stagnation of the Southern dimension.

The mixed policies offered by the EU, the lack of interest from the side of Germany, absence of differentiated approach towards the Southern Neighbourhood countries and diverse interests of the EU Member States with regard to the region were identified as significant drawbacks of the policy. The limits of sovereignty in Europe and the diversity of objectives pursued by the EU Member States make it difficult to shape a successful common policy approach, whereby a differentiated approach and unanimity, currently fragile but still existent, are important to be maintained. Conditionality remains key for the EU, however, the importance of enhancing interest of the respective countries in following up with reforms remains central, given the lack of motivation related to the EU approximation.

The importance of deeper and stronger understanding of the region, its impact on the overall neighbourhood of the European Union, the necessity of respecting individual cultures and national specific political systems were identified as key EU's approach towards the Southern Neighbourhood. EU could have been overambitious, but also "blind" to the differences of the individual countries and their political systems: the EuroMed region is large and diverse, most of the political systems present do not fit into how the EU works and the EU doesn't seem to have enough influence to demand significant change in the respective systems, no matter how much financial assistance is being provided, because financial resources do not necessarily mean reforms. Moreover, the EU tends to request more than it gives: it implements its desired way of business but doesn't incentivize the countries well enough to carry on reforming. The possible solution could be in following the Central Asia pattern of bridging education and cooperation instead of mere investment, which is not sustainable at the end of the day. Investing in educational systems could end up empowering a new generation of change-makers that would contribute to more sustainable changes.







The priorities for the New Agenda for the Mediterranean identified touch upon the possible creation of EU agencies in the countries rather than financing opposition and interfering in political life of the countries in the region, which might backfire at some point undermining EU's desired objectives. Civil society has been also identified as a key element of cooperation, despite its significant weakness in changing established political systems. Additionally, clear objectives identified by the EU along with partnership cooperation rather than imposition would greatly contribute to the success of the renewed policy in the region.

Within the Eastern Partnership cluster, the panel discussed the upcoming Eastern Partnership Summit along with its outlined agenda, revision of the policy (key aspects to be revised, new strategy?). It also touched upon the fragmentation of the Eastern Partnership and Differentiation of the ENP policies, mentioning the surge of sub-regional cooperations and initiatives focused on European integration of the region and striving to achieve enhanced cooperation with the EU. The experts also discussed the priorities of the upcoming EaP Summit, in particular in the sight of the recent geopolitical modifications in the region with regard to Belarus. Protection of Human Rights Activists, Rule of Law, Tackling Corruption and Security were discussed as key aspects within the region.



Agenda is great on paper. They do not have the capacity to be the security provider the EU wants them to be.
The EU need to find local solutions



The discussion on the Western Balkans domain touched upon the EU-China investment and consequent economic influence in the region in terms of sustainability of the economic diplomacy and its possible influence on the EU accession of the region. The issue of enlargement was discussed in the framework of the upcoming Slovenian Presidency in the EU Council, also touching upon the "Macron initiative" and the new EU methodology in pre-accession negotiations.

Priorities of the new agenda:

How to improve human rights implementation? The best thing would be to build agency in the countries, best approach in democracy promotion. The EU has to break the political parties. It cannot fund it. Important to empower human right activists and NGOs. Very dangerous to give money to funds politics. But it is not the best approach for the reputation of the EU, it already has many problems with hypocrisy. In the end, all is interconnected so you have to be careful who you fund, it can ruin the balance and relation with a country. EU has to be careful with human rights. We don't pay as much attention as immaterial human rights, we should be more careful in our partnership. It would be easier to implement system if we goes according to the national culture. We have to goes with the culture. Human rights don't mean the same for everyone. We have to understand the other, our partner, we need to adapt. Civil society can be very political. Sometimes, what they want can be considered human rights but If you fund, you should not just fund the politics. Also, often, the civil society is too weak to reverse politics. Maybe the EU should wonder how to fund the opposition. How can we manage

Move forward for security and peace:

Agenda is great on paper. They do not have the capacity to be the security provider the EU wants them to be. The EU need to find local solutions. Double age sword > do we want it to become a threat for the EU or do we want to act. The EU took too long to realise things.

We send money, formateurs in the south but we don't work with them. Maybe we miss a real partnership,







egual dimension in the southern partnership. The perspectives are not clear enough. The EU needs to know what it wa nts (and at what price, Libya's example).

Possibilities of what can be done:

DIFFERENTIATION AND FRAGMENTATION

Russia actions have convinced Ukrainians that the EU is a better option (it's not coming from the EU). The EU should work more on its public diplomacy and policy.

Membership is a sign those countries want (?). These countries need a strong backing from MS (so far, Poland was backing them but it has lost its credibility so who now?). The Eu won't go down the road of a country that has not a full control of its territory.

The EU is in perpetual management fragile, so it does not sell dream to the small countries. Their only way to get on the agenda is to be assertive and push themselves to gain some sort of finalité. Currently, we have an issue of not sharing a common agenda for MS. Moldova and Ukraine communicate a lot with Brussels but not the MS. But they need to speak more with the individuals, it would help them more. Efforts should go both way.

New countries don't experiment the enlargement fatigue so they are more open to enlarging and lobbying for that. The 2004 enlargement was a lot of countries and they could negotiate a better entry deal because they were so much. But for the upcoming, example, Montenegro is a small country so they have less weigh when it comes to negotiate their entry. If they were applying as a block, it would be more efficient.

Subregional groupes:

Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine > Lublin triangle
Maybe they just don't speak with the occidental states
because it is not their policy. They go to who they know.
Some countries have a common history and they want to
stay together to finish what they had started (?) The
center of EU has changed, a new one has appeared in the
East. They don't speak to us, they speak between them.
Lublin triangle is very new, created last year. Belarus was
the fourth country in mind, but the position

changed last year and with the absorption of Belarus in Russia. Russia is slowly taking over. Euro integration is key and it evolved the question of security.

How much place should security have in the upcoming summit and policy?

The EU quickly decided on a common position, but they should take time to write a real strong position toward Belarus. The EU should incorporate a new common ground for this country.

The EU strategy should be country-specific. You cannot incorporate the Belarus in security strategy. A very specific one should be made for Belarus. The EU should have acted sooner and the more they will be tied to Russia, the more dangerous for EU they will be.

The EU is never proactive, only responsive. Russia is always one step ahead because the EU does not try to act first. They only answer in sanctions, which make their threat empty because it is not credible nor new. The EU should be more political and not avoid security. The EU can be creative and do new things but they really need to take active approaches.


Russia is key, but we have to keep in mind that there are other players in the room.

EU is not a hard power and they always look for multi level answer. They wait for the UN to act but as it never comes, they do nothing. Their actions are not effective. Creating a true diplomatic program. The EU does not have the power to finish and push what it does want to do. We see major figures talking but not the EU. Empower the actors and maybe the EEAS for diplomacy? The MS are scared to have a powerful EU diplacy or military progression.

The Commission is responsible for a lot but at the end, the Council is deciding.

Lack of European public diplomacy, we lack credibility. How are you supposed to talk as one with 27 différents foreign policy? We lack clarity of who decide what and how. So we won't be able







WESTERN BALKAN - ENLARGMENT

Dépend of the country that has the présidence, they do not have all the same power. They can put it on the agenda but it does not mean the enlargment will happen. The conditionality is so strong, you have to be « perfect » to access.

Croatia has presidency in 2020. But at the same time, the timeframe can lead to result. If there is two countries advocately strongly and putting it on the agenda, it can happen. But at the same time, all decisions are kind of made based on consensus. If Croatia and Slovenia had pushed to put enlargement on the agenda, they could have bargained with bigger players by promising to support their propositions later. Maybe Slovenia will be able to put the enlargment on the table and then the big players will have to deal with it.

Back to the Lublin triangle, should something similar be created with the Balkans to support their

If big countries said no, its no. They often have power and their views are accepted/kept in the end. We have to think of what enlargment is bringing. We have to appreciate the process made by the countries, because it is really hard. More important to build solidarity between the existing members rather than enlarg. We should first build back our solidarity before considering welcoming new members.

position? It already exist?

If we incorporate right now the balkans in the Eu, it would be great for Germany (and enhance their power). We need to balance the powers more and think the relation between France-Germany and the Balkans.

We need the future of Europe and a strong talk with the balkans.

Disagree because there will always be the need of unanimity and the risk of blocking. Because more countries mean more views so no necessarily good for Germany. Also it can totally change the Eu vibes (maybe it will be more eco or political rather than what it is now). Sometimes, small countries can block big important things. Maybe a reform could bring great things to the EU.

Do we really want to welcome countries with authoritarian derives. Serbia and Albania had problems with the elections and democracy. We have troubles with political leaders and there is also the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo to manage. Also, some countries clearly said the EU was not their current main priorité. Do people really want to join the EU? Well maybe ten years ago, but now they have others priorities (zlso, négociation rounds exhausted them). There are others problems to deal with before joining the EU. But also, can we accept them if their leader does not comply with EU's values. How would the western balkans caused the same problems as Poland for example? Leaders also ask the question of credibility. The EU address the leaders, not the people so th Union has less weigh. The problems that the region introduce are new (ex:genocide). How to deal with the responsibility, especially when some leaders are denying it. The EU is absent on that.

We are critizing their leaders but ours are not necessarily better. They have a lot of powers too (just don't use it). We have condemning things that are a mix of our own system. We can't implement something if we don't do it ourself.

It is hypocritical to ask if we want to welcome them because we have Poland in (they are the one with the most fundings) and yet, there is applicant countries doing better than this state. Another issue with EU is that it still does not recognised Kosovo. Enlargment is more and more politisée. It is no more the question of enlargment but rather proving 'we still have standards'. The EU is also very quiet during Brexit, which is important: the EU need to be more vocal because otherwise, it will easily loose the public support. Building a strong public diplomacy and network would help.

When Turkey understood it would not become a MS, they turn their back to EU!!



Within the EU, we have the possibility to adopt binding legislative measures to ensure climate targets are respected, but with non-EU countries, this isn't as simple. Here, the EU can make use of its instruments for external action.

Panel 3: Policies and responses to Europe's challenges

Question 1: The Green Deal has been presented as a key priority for Ursula von der Leyen's Commission, including the goal to turn Europe into the world's first climateneutral continent by 2050. From a political point of view, the environment is a central topic, shaping all aspects of the European economy. Looking at all sectors combined, how do you perceive the impact of the Green Deal, and how can we benefit from it?

- External effects of EU climate policy: It is important that the Green Deal sends a strong political signal not only to the Member States, but also to countries outside of the EU. Within the EU, we have the possibility to adopt binding legislative measures to ensure climate targets are respected, but with non-EU countries, this isn't as simple. Here, the EU can make use of its instruments for external action.
- A concrete goal for the von der Leyen
 Commission could be to reform the Energy
 Taxation Directive, which was last revised in
 2003. This is difficult because unanimous
 agreement is required from the Member States
 (? fact-check). However, thanks to a reform, we
 could ensure that fossil fuels are subjected to a
 less advantageous tax regime, and renewables
 are taxed more lightly. This would be a great
 achievement for the current Commission.








Question 2: Since 2019, accelerating the digital transition has been at the heart of the Commission's policies. As we're heading for a period of economic recovery, to what extent can the digital sector serve as an engine for our economy, and more broadly, as a lever for improving European citizens' quality of life?

- Firstly, the digital transition can be seen as a tool for the EU's strategic autonomy. This is the meaning of the Digital Service Act, which requires platforms, especially the GAFAM, to be more responsible. We perceived this as an important stake especially for the strategic autonomy of the EU, but also as an opportunity for European economic actors to become more competitive from a global perspective.
- For society, we defined the digital transition as being able to have a real interest, and perhaps, and to be a real vector of progress going in the interest of European citizens. The challenge of privacy for European citizens was also addressed, especially through the huge development of connected system to control citizens like cameras in cities eg.
- In terms of R&I, the main challenge for the EU would be to ensure that targets are met. Furthermore, the EU should invest more in digital R&I to defend its autonomy from China and the US. The EU is currently very much behind them, in terms of volume of investment for digital innovation.

Question 3: The EU is coming out of a health crisis during which it had to mobilise its resources at an unprecedented speed (think of the recovery fund, and investments in research and innovation). What lessons can the EU draw from this experience as it is aiming to build a more resilient Europe?

• The old wisdom was confirmed: Europe evolves through crises. Faced with an urgent situation, the EU was able to act quickly and decisively to muster budgetary resources for recovery. In the process, we took a significant new step towards further integration. An open question is, how could we make the EU act with the same effectiveness in normal circumstances?








 The pandemic has taught us to rethink our relationship to the environment. During the lockdown, nature quite literally won back space from humans, which was a poignant illustration of how we are affecting the environment. As such, the pandemic has awoken us to work harder on climate and biodiversity.









Values in the EU should be an end and not a mean to arrive to spread the EU values.



Panel 4: Europe in the world: Towards strategic autonomy?

1. Geopolitical Europe

In the last several years, we have witnessed an increase of instability in the European Union's neighbourhood. Crises in the neighbourhood had a direct impact on Europe (migration, terrorism, disinformation, rise of xenophobia). The EU has often lacked a common will and ability to act decisively. In your opinion, how can the EU become a stabilizing actor in a turmoiled neighbourhood? Is the intergovernmental nature of the EU FP a challenge or ab opportunity for it to become a geopolitical actor?

- → The EU shouldn't delegate power to other country, for example the migration policy
- → Unamity in the Commission is a necessity to show unity, it gave a stronger negotiation leverage
- → The EU need a common european doctrine deciding orientation and direction foreign politics, which would allows declination to take into consideration regional specificity
- → The EU, inspired by the Monroe Doctrine, should mark their red lines, the behaviour neighbour countries are not allowed as well as their sphere of influence
- → neighbourhood policy should be reformed. We can't have a powerful Europe with a burning neighbourhood. Balkans problematics are abandoned for inside issues. In the reform, the EU should do better use of the allocate money by using the principle of conditionality

2. Strategic Autonomy

With a more vocal American dissatisfaction vis-à-vis European involvement in common defence, a lively debate on European strategic autonomy is taking place. How would you define the term? Does the EU have sufficient resources to ensure its strategic autonomy? Which policy areas are key to achieve strategic autonomy?


- → The EU should highlight its History and Culture as a mean to legitimate its existence and so its actions
- → The EU needs leverages as means of actions in its foreign policy
- → investments should be centralized at the EU level. It is Russia and China method, it is their advantage and it make them more effective
- \rightarrow Values in the EU should be an end and not a mean to arrive to spread the EU values
- → E.U. member states most don't have power to act outside, so it is hard to act collectively
- → need to change the mindset of the population, make people aware of the EU work
- → incorporate eastern slavic mentality in the EU spirit
- → need to be competitive and more attractive to reach strategic autonomy
- → better logic in our trade: for ex agriculture, import less agricultural products and use the EU production
- → a person made the point that we will probably never be strategically autonome and maybe it's not an end

3. Digital Sovereignety

In the last decade, we have seen the rise of China as a challenger to American tech dominance. Following American restrictive measures under both the Trump and Biden administrations, there seems to be no end to the ongoing tech war. In this tense global tech context, how can Europe establish itself as a third powerhouse?

- → we're late on the digital area, we need to regulate but not too aggressively to avoid an exclusion of the leading digital firms
- → their is a problem of competition with our old EU companies and big new companies in the us or china
- → talked about the cybersecurity and how important strategic sectors should be in the hands of eu (ex: nuclear)








- → importance of investment: need more and focus on strategic sectors
- → the investment on the green deal, a opportunity to reform and be a competitor in the energy sector



The involvement of the EP might be taken into account to increase democratic legitimacy but should remain low in order to let experts act, even more when there is an urgency.



Question 1:

The ECB was consciously designed to be independent, a feature written into the treaties. It was thus not made even theoretically subject to the instructions of any other body, including the European Parliament or national parliaments and its primary missions are described clearly and concisely in the treaties. In this case, is the increase of competences, the use of new instruments or exceptional measures during crises by the ECB still justified by an independent institution? Moreover, who should take the responsibility of its actions, Member States, European Citizens, the Institutions or others?

The debate started with the question of whether the ECB had exceeded its mandate by its "exceptional measures" during the financial crisis (such as quantitative easing). The room was split in two, with those on the one hand claiming that the ECB had breached its own mandate, while others argued that it had not because it was necessary to maintain price stability for example. However, both sides agreed on the necessity of the actions taken by the ECB, arguing that the measures taken were necessary and therefore justified.

The main debate was on the democratic legitimacy of the Institution. On the one hand, some said the means justify the ends (like the non-conventional measures). Efficiency is the key so it doesn't need that "democratic debates" to be a situation of urgency because it didn't allow for debates because the speed of reaction would have been lower and







the crisis might have been even worse. Finally, the utilitarian argument of the great job it has done during the crisis is legitimate because they limited its impact and "saved the euro". On the other hand, some pinpointed the input legitimacy as a problem. Indeed, during the crisis management the ECB was involved in political debates by determining national budgets with conditionalities for example in Greece. So, the ECB had some kind of political power but without any democratic accountability.

Thirdly, the question of the independence of the ECB came up. Indeed, some added it's not that the Institution is not fully independent because it was mostly created and driven by a "german ideology" and point of view, such as the huge focus on price stability. Therefore, they argued the Institution only has a "german point of view" and not a european one. However, some argued there are enough checks and balances to ensure the independence of the ECB.

At this point, two solutions were proposed to deal with the supposed "democratic deficit" of the ECB: The first one was a greater involvement of the EP when electing the ECB board to increase the democratic legitimacy of the ECB, but not more than that during urgency time.


The second proposition was to introduce an exceptional clause in treaties for the ECB to do more in time of emergency. However, other participants flagged that it would create maybe the room for expanding too far its competences with no limits. This point wasn't not agreed by most of the people.

To conclude:

The debate on democratic mostly was about the input legitimacy and to tackle that for example, the involvement of the EP might be taken into account to increase democratic legitimacy but should remain low in order to let experts act, even more when there is an urgency. The ECB should mostly stay technocratic. There is a need to change the treaties and include more competencies to reflect the new competences it added, but reform the treaty might be complicated due it would be a harsh bargaining btw countries

Maybe to avoid the exceptional measures taken we







should think broadly and tackle the problem from the "root", by adding fiscal and banking union not to repeat the same mistakes as before and let the private debt reach a too high level which was one of the main reasons for the EuroZone crisis.

Question 2:

Question 3:

One year after the Hamiltonian moment of the EU observers notice that the Hamiltonian spirit is waning as European economies recover and the covid-crisis appears to be under control. *The German former finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble recently reminded Europeans in an op-ed that "borrowing in times of crisis to stabilise the economy makes sense, as long as the question of repayment is not forgotten."* With the re-opening of the debate on the stability and growth rules, what ideas do you think should be considered when reformulating them? Are the dogmas of price stability and avoiding moral hazard still relevant? What would it take for the EU to leave behind the "smallcountry syndrome" that has characterized the response to crises in the past? What should the new Stability and Growth rules look like?